A Conceptualist Construal of the Semantic View of Physical Theories
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.57125/FP.2024.12.30.07Keywords:
Relativism, conceptual framework, idealised conceptualisation, theoretical modelAbstract
What is the relationship between the models of a physical theory and the systems and processes in its domain? This question arises for philosophers of science from the semantic view of such theories, which conceive a theory as a set of classes of models ⎯where the concept of physical model plays a crucial role. The semantic view is a conception of the structure of theories, and it becomes neutral about their content, allowing it to be assumed from different philosophical stances about science. We adopt the conceptualist or conceptual relativism stance about science to try a plausible thesis on that epistemological question, which contrasts with the theses sustained by realist, instrumentalist, and empiricist philosophers. We intend to elaborate on theoretical models, considering that abstractions and idealisations are ubiquitous in physical theories, from laws to models, and reside in their conceptual frameworks. The key idea of our proposal is that models provide idealised conceptualisations of bodily processes.
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