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The Two Philosophical Thoughts of Pluralism – Hegel and Wittgenstein's Reflections on Pluralism

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Abstract. In this paper, there are two philosophical schemes for understanding pluralistic thinking, Hegel's philosophical scheme for reconciling monism and plurality within reason, and Wittgenstein's pluralistic thinking based on decoupling and splitting of certainty and knowledge beyond the bounds of reason. Both paths have their advantages and disadvantages, so a path of prudential reflection could be given. The research method of this paper is based on the discussion of the history of philosophy, the inner logical thinking of philosophy, and the discussions of the philosophies of Hegel and Wittgenstein. It outlines that the conflict between reason and will is the core of understanding the issue of diversity. The research results demonstrate that the conflict between "Reason and Will", and the priority relationship between the two, constitute two paradigms for discussing diversity, and further argue that the conflict between individuals and communities is the practical condition of the diversity issue. Therefore, it advocates a new solution to the problem of diversity. The significance of this study is to achieve harmony between the community and the individual in a diverse world, while ensuring individual freedom. Metaphysics is indispensable to the discussion of Pluralism, without which we cannot provide a solid foundation for the discussion of Pluralism, so this paper attempts to seek some

kind of new philosophical path from the comparative study of Wittgenstein's and Hegel's philosophies. Previous studies have neglected the philosophical effects of the conflict between "Reason and Will", which is the starting point of this study.

Keywords: Reason; Will; Conflict; Diversity; Metaphysics.

Introduction

The issues of unity and uniformity, when considered from the perspective of political philosophy, are manifested as struggles and competitions between the community and the individual. It can be expressed as the community suffocating individual rights, or as individual rights surpassing the demands of the community, thereby provoking a backlash from the community. However, from a deeper perspective, the consideration of unity and diversity first and foremost expresses a consideration of metaphysics. As a mode of metaphysical thinking, the dispute between unity and diversity runs through the history of metaphysics. Ionian philosophers were amazed at the observable unity and diversity in the universe. How could there be a fundamental unity behind the diversity of phenomena. In the Eleatic school, the question was raised, "Is being one or many?" The question was asked, "Which is the true report of the apparent contradiction between the diversity of our senses and the unity of our reason? This is the fundamental question which the beginning of philosophy teaches us. This fundamental question of philosophy necessitates that its metaphysical thinking must address the balance between diversity and the unity. On the one hand, philosophy must resort to a kind of unifying explanation, and on the other hand, philosophy must confront the varied and complex phenomena. Thus, starting from ancient Greek philosophy, philosophers have faced the challenge of using a single substrate to explain the diverse and complex phenomena. In modern philosophy, this problem has transformed into how the subject, with original and unifying functions, integrates and unifies diverse and complex sensory contents. In 20th-century philosophy, as a rebellion against rationalism, philosophers have used diversity to rebel against unity, rejecting it as a form of "rational hegemony." Nietzsche put forward the idea of perspectivism, the belief that there are no uniform facts, but only phenomena that are revealed based on different perspectives. He sought to use such ideas to oppose the traditional philosophy of rational monism. It is evident that ancient Greek philosophy, modern philosophy, and 20th-century philosophy are deeply rooted in the consideration of the relationship between diversity and unity.

In this paper, I attempt to consider two philosophical approaches to the relationship between diversity and unity, starting from the perspectives of Hegel and Wittgenstein, two philosophers. These two approaches are precisely two typical approaches that help to reveal the essential content of the dispute between unity and diversity, namely the dispute between will and reason.

Research problem

The research objective of this paper is to provide a new direction for thinking about a new "diversified" ideology by comparing the discussions of the philosophers Hegel and Wittgenstein on "diversity". Specifically, it addresses the following questions: (1) What deeper philosophical conflicts underlie the discussion of diversity? (2) How does the relationship between reason and will become the key to understanding diversity? (3) How do the two modes of reason and will create two different philosophical approaches, namely the philosophies of Hegel and Wittgenstein? (4) What new directions do the philosophies of Hegel and Wittgenstein offer for thinking about "diversity"?

Research Focus

The focus of this study is on how the conflict between reason and will manifests as the root of the two philosophical thoughts of pluralism and monism. Today, the conflict between the community and the individual has not only become the core of political philosophy and sociology, but it is also a metaphysical question in itself. Therefore, metaphysics cannot be absent from such studies and can provide metaphysical support for disciplines such as sociology, political philosophy, and anthropology. Thus, there is an urgent need to seek the basis of metaphysics in order to understand the conflict between pluralism and monism.

Research Aim and Research Questions

This study will delve into the different perspectives of Wittgenstein and Hegelian philosophy on the issue of unity and diversity. First, we will analyze in detail Wittgenstein's ideas, which split unity and diversity and thus maintain a balanced relationship again.

In contrast, Hegel's philosophical view emphasizes the interrelationship between unity and diversity. He argues that unity does not exclude diversity, but rather includes it. In Hegel's view, the relationship between the individual and the whole is crucial. He advocated the gradual realization of the unity of the individual and the whole through a continuous dialectical process. Thus, Hegel believed that the unity of the individual and the whole is realized through a process of continuous development and evolution.

This study will explore how the problem of unity and diversity can be resolved through a comparative analysis of the philosophies of Wittgenstein and Hegel. We will examine different philosophers' views on truth and language, as well as their definitions and understandings of unity and diversity. Further, we will examine the two philosophers' views on the relationship between the individual and the whole, and explore how to achieve a balance between unity and diversity in this relationship.

By delving into the philosophical perspectives of Wittgenstein and Hegel, this study aims to provide a deeper understanding of the relationship between unity and diversity and offer

possible solutions to this problem. In addition, by analyzing and comparing the philosophical ideas of these two philosophers, we will also explore the implications of the evolution and development of philosophical thought on the issue of unity and diversity.

Literature Review

The book by Emmanuel Levinas (1960) proposed that Hegel's pluralism is a false pluralism. Hegel's emphasis on "Totality" overlooks the existence of the "Other," so he did not truly realize the construction of a philosophy of pluralism.

The paper by Dean Moyar (2007) believes that Hegel once explained the view that a free society can accommodate different pluralities and benefit from different goods. Hegel also believed that the strength of the state lies not only in individuals pursuing their own goals, but also in being regarded by others as rational agents.

The article by Christopher Yeomans (2015) argues that Hegel's pluralism is a form of autonomy, where individuals must make decisions in various ways in order to achieve true plurality.

And the article by Christopher Yeomans (2019) analyzed Hegel's view of "Action," suggesting that in Hegel's "Philosophy of Right," there is a phenomenon of "misrecognition" that leads to the realization of community. The author points out that Hegel's theory of action is not only a necessity of necessity, but also demonstrates the flexibility of social ties.

Additionally, the article by Matthew J. Moore (2010) analyzed Wittgenstein's relationship with pluralism, believing that Wittgenstein's philosophy can provide evidence for supporting non-realist pluralists, as Wittgenstein's language games and forms of life theory imply that moral values are culturally constructed, without universal standards.

The paper by Manuel Pérez Otero (2016) analyzed Wittgenstein's "rule-following" and its relation to pluralism, based on the motivations of fuzzy pluralism and communitarianism. The former is expressed as a vagueness, progressiveness, without clear boundaries, supporting the view of fuzzy pluralism.

Ángeles J. Perona (2016) discussed Wittgenstein and Ortega y Gasset's philosophical reflections on reason. The author argues that Wittgenstein proposes a mild version of human rationality, which is malleable, open, resulting in plurality and contingency. At the same time, Wittgenstein argues for the indubitability of determinism in practice, seeking a balance between plurality and contingency.

Results and discussion

The split between subjectivity and entity: the basis of the conflict between pluralism and monism

In ontology and epistemology, there are two different philosophical principles. In the ontological stage, there is a lack of extreme subjectivity or subjectivity principle, and its core principle is the principle of substantiality, which is expressed as the whole precedes the individual, and the givenness presupposed by ontology precedes reflective knowledge. However, with the emergence of medieval philosophy, Christian faith merged into ancient Greek rational speculation, and the emphasis on faith and rationalism led to a rift and division, which greatly enriched the connotation and breadth of philosophical speculation in this division.

On the other hand, due to the internal division of Christianity, it expanded into faith and reason, free will and determinism, creator and creature, and many other forms of division. Behind these forms of division, the true division is the collision and division of two philosophical principles, namely the principle of substantiality and the principle of subjectivity.

In the principle of substantiality, the existence postulated by ontology, regardless of whether it is called "idea", "intelligible form", "existence", or "God", is imagined to be given and directly given to itself. In the principle of subjectivity, Descartes suspended the validity of the ontological presupposition in a "universal doubt" manner, thereby clearing the space for cognitive reflection.

However, the American scholar Michael Mien Gillespie has pointed out that, in fact, before Descartes' turn to epistemology, there was a far-reaching "Nominalist Revolution". It was the appearance of the "Nominalist Revolution" that prompted the rise of epistemology or the principle of subjectivity. In the *Theological Origins of Modernity* (2008), Michael Gillespie shows how the Nominalist revolution in the fourteenth century, signalled "the collapse of the medieval world and the rise of modernity"

In his view, in the traditional world view of scholastic philosophy, the world was firmly bound in a teleological system, which provided both restraint and a sense of security. The philosophical foundation on which this teleological system relies is the view of common reality. In contrast, in the late Middle Ages, in order to resist the philosophical system of Thomas Aquinas, anti-Thomists emerged. They proposed radical nominalist and voluntarist views, opposing Aquinas' rationalist views. This can be summarized into two points:

1. Only the individual is real, and any commonality is just a name;
2. God is omnipotent and can destroy what seems to be a rational order at any time.

When discussing Ockham, Gillespie said: " Moreover, human knowledge can never move beyond hypothesis, for God is free in the fullest sense, that is, free even from his previous

decisions. He can thus overturn anything he has established, interrupt any chain of causes, or create the world again from the beginning if he wants to. " (Gillespie, 2008)

In this "Nominalist Revolution", individual consciousness was further emphasized, the instability of the world was further emphasized, and it also stimulated philosophers to further seek a philosophical solution after the "Nominalist Revolution", that is, to balance the relationship between "God" and "human", establish a new philosophy with "human" or "subjectivity" as the domain, and provide a new sense of security.

However, in reality, the philosophical impact brought about by the Nominalist Revolution is extremely profound, because at its core, it clarifies that the freedom of the subject faces a double impact - on the one hand, it must face the impact of the necessity order established by some kind of rationality, and on the other hand, it must also face the impact of the instability and insecurity brought about by contingency.

On the other hand, the freedom of the subject must also rely on both necessity and contingency, the dual logic of will and reason, because without necessity, free causes cannot be established; without free causes, free will cannot be established; without free will, the principle of subjectivity cannot be established. Conversely, without contingency, there can be no freedom, without the possibility of freedom, free will cannot be established, and without free will, the principle of subjectivity cannot be established.

Therefore, the establishment of free will must be based on both the impact and internalization of necessity and contingency. It must carefully manage its relationship with the necessity order established by reason on the one hand, and its relationship with "capricious will" on the other.

Furthermore, free will is the foundation of the conflict between pluralism and monism—if there is no free will, only a kind of overall order can be imagined, and the possibility of pluralism is extinguished. Therefore, the conflict between pluralism and monism is actually the conflict of the subject itself. If the subject is to be established, it must be given the space of freedom. To give the subject the space of freedom, on the one hand, it must establish the subject's sense of security, and on the other hand, it must establish the subject's agency. The former provides a dimension of necessity, and the latter provides a dimension of possibility. Only when both dimensions coexist can free will be established, thereby establishing the subject, ultimately establishing the dimension of pluralism.

In modern philosophy, with the rise of Francis Bacon and René Descartes' philosophy, Bacon advocated "knowledge is power" and implied a commitment to ontology, that there exists a pre-existing, absolutely reliable world. In Bacon's view, the senses are deceptive and lead us to being unable to grasp things themselves through pure sensation, and must rely on "experimentation"; the natural world can only reveal its key mystery in "experimentation".

Bacon said, "For since they are used not to make a product but to reveal the natural cause in something, they equally answer to their intention, however they turn out; since they put an end to the question. Thus we must seek to acquire a greater stock of experiments, and experiments of a different kind than we have yet done; and we must also introduce a quite different method, order and process of connecting and advancing experience." (Bacon, 2000)

How can we achieve stability of the subject? It can only be achieved through "knowledge." In Bacon's view, so-called knowledge lies in the ability to control nature, because "what is most useful in operating is truest in knowing." (Bacon, 2000) In other words, according to Bacon, so-called "knowledge" is not about seeking "truth," but about seeking "power," or control over nature. And so, "controlling nature" establishes an absolutely stable world. When controlling nature, necessity and stability are indeed gained, however, freedom is also lost.

Similar to Bacon, the philosophical principle of Descartes is "Clarity and Distinctness," which still emphasizes the absoluteness of knowledge, and the purpose of absoluteness is to emphasize the establishing of the subject's stability in the world.

Here, whether Bacon or Descartes, the reason they established their respective philosophical theories was in response to an unstable world and a "capricious God" after the "Nominalist Revolution." As Gillespie, M. A said, "I will argue that Descartes sought to construct a bastion of reason against this terrifying God of nominalism, a bastion that could provide not only individual certainty and security, and not only mitigate or eliminate the inconveniences of nature, but also bring an end to the religious and political strife that were tearing Europe to pieces." (Gillespie, 2008)

According to the implications of the "Nominalist Revolution," the "capricious God" could instantaneously destroy any rational order, providing strong deconstructive meaning, but losing its constructive meaning. While Bacon and Descartes respectively established their attitudes toward nature and knowledge, their attitudes have a common core, which is to focus on the subject and establish the subject's stability.

But doing so necessarily damages the status and meaning of "will" in philosophy. Thus, Descartes claimed that the will must be regulated by "reason" (intellectus). He said: "since the will extends further than the intellect, I do not contain the will within the same boundaries; rather, I also extend it to things I do not understand." (Descartes, 1999) In his view, God is good and does not deceive mankind, thus making knowledge stable and effective. Both of these philosophical approaches aimed to establish reason as prior to will, and transcending will, rationalizing the image of the "capricious God" from the "Nominalist Revolution," thereby providing stability.

But how should the conflict between "pluralism" and "monism" be understood here? It should be said that the existence of the will provides the possibility for "pluralism". On the contrary, the emphasis on the stability and absoluteness of knowledge actually eliminates

"pluralism" and leads to actual "monism of knowledge".

However, the conflict between "pluralism" and "monism" here is latent, hidden in the shell of "reason" and "will."

After Descartes, Leibniz pointed out the conflict between pluralism and monism. Leibniz proposed the "monadology" as a philosophical approach, in which the monads lack interaction with each other, Leibniz said, "Accidents cannot become detached, or wander about outside of substances, as the sensible species of the Scholastics once did. Thus, neither substance nor accident can enter a monad from outside." (Strickland, 2014) However, the monads are plural, which immediately raises a question: how do plural monads without interaction channels complete the interaction?

Leibniz took two paths to solve this difficult problem:

1. The path of will. In Leibniz's view, he pointed out that the "monad" has a "desire" (Begehren). The existence of "desire" indicates the meaning of "will," in Leibniz's view, it allows for the transition from one perception to another, with the ultimate goal being the "complete concept" it pursues. Therefore, "desire" actually provides a trend toward pluralism, indicating that different monads are plural and exist with differences.

He said: " The name 'entelechies' could be given to all simple substances, or created monads, for they have in themselves a certain perfection. There is a self-sufficiency which makes them the sources of their internal actions and incorporeal automata, so to speak. "(Strickland, 2014)

2. The path of reason. Leibniz proposed the "Pre-Established Harmony" to resolve the issue of the unity of multiple monads.

It's easy to see that the path of will actually leads to a "pluralistic philosophy," while the path of reason points to a "monistic philosophy." In this contradictory way, Leibniz pointed out the conflict between monism and pluralism, and the conflict behind it, namely the conflict between reason and will. The conflict between reason and will is actually a conflict between the two orientations of the subject, namely theoretical reason seeking necessity and stability, and practical reason seeking agency and freedom.

Therefore, after Leibniz, Kant appeared with critical philosophy, and completely resolved Leibniz's contradictory approach within the subject itself, resulting in the extension of "intellect as autocratic legislation" and "reason as self-legislation."

However, though Kant's philosophical approach is different from Leibniz's approach, they are similar in nature; the "kingdom of ends" established by practical reason is a pluralistic kingdom of personalities, but it is also a kingdom governed by moral laws, thus it is a "Pre-Established Harmony."

However, Kant's brilliance over Leibniz lies in the fact that he saw that this "Pre-Established Harmony" could only be realized in the "kingdom of ends," and could not be established in the phenomenal world on this side, thereby further making it clear that the conflict between pluralism and monism. The conflict between monism and pluralism can be seen in the conflict between reason and will. Reason creates a general order, while will creates a world outside the limitations of reason. Thus, there are two possible philosophical approaches to resolving the conflict between pluralism and monism:

The first approach is to transcend will through reason, rationalize the will and thus realize a pluralistic approach within reason.

The second approach is to transcend reason through will, instrumentalize reason, and thus achieve a pluralistic approach where will dominates reason.

Recognition: rational internalization of will

According to the above view, there will be two paths to pluralism. The first path is the rational internalization path of the will, which is typified by Hegel's dialectical system. One can call Hegel's dialectical path the path within "epistemology". Hegel tries to achieve the resolution of the contradiction between diversity and unity through rational internalization.

I attempt to interpret Hegel's pluralism from two paths. First, Hegel's dialectics is a rational philosophical trend that attempts to abandon irrationality and heterogeneous things. Unlike Leibniz and Kant, Kant's rationality is a negative rationality, that is, Kant attempts to establish "intellect for natural legislation" to resist the erosion of nature by the "capriciousness" of God in the deism revolution, and to establish "reason for self-legislation" to resist the erosion of moral laws by the "capriciousness" of God, in order to save theoretical rationality and practical rationality.

However, Hegel's philosophy is more keenly aware than Kant that this pattern is an evasion and an attempt to evade irrationality and heterogeneous things. True rationality must be active. The activity of rationality is expressed as the spirit's ability to abandon irrationality and heterogeneous things and regard heterogeneous things as products set by reason itself. Hegel says:

"No, spirit is this power only by looking the negative in the face and lingering with it. This lingering is the magical power that converts it into being." (Hegel, 2018)

That is, when rationality faces heterogeneity and void, it is not trying to evade the possibility of their existence, but dares to internalize them in its own self, thus regarding them as set by rationality itself. And Hegel realizes that the relationship between rationality and heterogeneous things is not a relationship of either, nor is it a simple rejection. On the contrary,

rationality can only be activated through the use of the heterogeneity of irrationality. This is also what Hegel emphasizes as an active rationality, that is, "contradictory" rationality. The discussion of this relationship between rationality and heterogeneous things implies the handling of the "plural problem" and the "singular problem", that is, rationality does not construct a perfect rational palace and become a total order under pure unity, on the contrary, rationality must accommodate heterogeneity, must accommodate its plurality.

Plurality and unity are not mutually exclusive, on the contrary, the unity of spirit must rely on plurality to realize itself. So unlike conventional Hegelian philosophy, Hegel's philosophy does not exclude plurality, on the contrary, he is more keenly aware that plurality is not the enemy of unity, on the contrary, plurality precisely forges the richness of rationality itself, thus providing a richer connotation for the activity of unified rationality. When the unified spirit can be internalized into the plurality, and allows rationality to face negation, the spirit also enriches its own connotation when it holds its position in opposition. Therefore, when the spirit faces heterogeneity and plurality, it is not trying to exclude their existence, nor is it trying to eliminate their existence, on the contrary, it is through a "reconciliation" approach, so that plurality is recognized within unity, and unity is enriched in plurality. In contrast, Kant tried to establish an abstract kingdom of purpose on the other side, in Hegel's view, this path is precisely empty and abstract, because such a rationality can only be negative, it completely abandons the characteristic of rationality to confront plurality. It is only able to establish a moral community and kingdom of purpose in the other world, to reconcile the relationship between diverse personalities and rationality.

In other words, the kingdom of purpose in Kant contains an inference that in the kingdom of purpose, diversity is exactly eliminated, only the individuals who follow the moral regulations can enter Kant's kingdom of purpose, although the kingdom of purpose has many members, they are all following the moral rules, so that diversity is unity. However, Hegel's dialectics attempts to reconcile the conflict between diversity and unity, at this point, unity is diversity, because as an absolute spirit, it should recognize diversity and its own connectivity and intermediacy, and spirit cannot directly grasp reality, spirit must realize itself through intermediaries, and intermediaries are precisely the embodiment of diversity.

Second, Hegel attempts to understand the reconciliation of diversity and unity through the path of "Acknowledgment". Whether it is Kant's philosophy or the entire German idealism system, the essence is of "free spirit". And what is freedom? Hegel defines it as the spirit relies on itself, the spirit regulates itself. As mentioned earlier, the spirit should dare to abandon heterogeneity, instead of avoiding it. The biggest heterogeneity is the "other" beyond the individual reason. Because unlike the treatment of things, which cannot be treated like objects to another self, the treatment of things is a Baconian "experiment" and "interrogation", while the treatment of people is a relationship between subjects. It is precisely because of the existence of subjectivity, Hegel introduces the discussion of "Acknowledgment" (Anerkennung),

"acknowledgment" has many connotations, among which the most important connotation is "acceptance". And this "acceptance" is not only in the cognitive and rational sense, but it also includes acceptance in the field of practice.

Hegel's view on "acknowledgment" focuses mainly on the "Master-Slave Dialectic" in "Phenomenology of Spirit", it includes four stages:

1. Desire, struggle between life and death;
2. Mutual recognition;
3. Establishment of the master-slave relationship and fear of death;
4. Labour.

Hegel expresses the immediacy of the self as general desire, general desire is to negate the existence of things in order to prove its own existence. The reason why it is generalized desire is that this kind of desire is pure will, not only in humans, but also in animals. However, human self-consciousness exceeds this kind of desire, it is expressed as human consciousness realizing that the other is an independent self-consciousness just like me. And life is a movement for itself, a process of abandoning individuality and returning to universality, and then abandoning universality and returning to individuality, a cycle of birth and death. When universality and individuality are unified, life rises to a class. Although human beings can realize that the other is a self-consciousness just like me, such acknowledgment is still natural, rather than social.

Only through the way of life-and-death struggles can both parties be forced into a social relationship and separated from animals. The struggle between life and death contains transcendent value, that is, mutual recognition, in mutual recognition, human beings transition from natural beings to social beings, and humanity enters civilized society. Self-consciousness has duality, One, self-consciousness realizes that the other is also self-consciousness, discovering that its essence is also within the other; Two, self-consciousness can only affirm itself by negating the other. But the two are contradictory, because once the other is denied, so is the essence of the self, which is "Self-Deception". Only through "Self-Deception" can one abandon its non-essence and realize the sociality between oneself and the other, and develop into the stage of Mutual recognition. In the struggle between life and death, one fears death and gives up the struggle, becoming a slave, while the victor becomes a master. The reason why the master is a master is that he overcomes the fear of death, and the slave becomes a slave because he fears death and gives up his self-consciousness, descending to the level of animals.

However, the establishment of the master-slave relationship is a contradictory mechanism, because, One, the establishment of the master-slave relationship allows the master to gain an independent personality, but the process of the master driving the slave makes the master indulge in the desire to become natural, descending to being a natural thing; Two, because the

slave becomes a thing, the master cannot witness his own essence through the other, and thus loses his essence. Therefore, Hegel's argument already embodies a requirement of teleology, that "Mutual recognition" is the way to stabilize the establishment of the self and the other's self-consciousness or essence, and only through the way of "Mutual recognition" can a universal self-consciousness be established. That is, as a unified universal freedom consciousness cannot be separated from the Mutual recognition of individual consciousness, and the plurality is actually integrated into the domain of the universal freedom consciousness. This is Hegel's thinking on plurality, that is, his thinking on pluralism integrates diversity into the relationship of unity, although at this point, unity is no longer a pure rational order, but as the ability of active rationality to transcend contradictions and heterogeneity.

So why can Hegel's thinking on pluralism only present itself in this way? It is because Hegel attempts to reconcile the relationship between rationality and heterogeneity within rationality, that is, diversity can only be recognized by internalizing into the unity, although unity also needs Mutual recognition of plurality to be established. However, here, it is still reconciliation within the domain of rationality.

On Certainty: Will transcends reason

As mentioned previously, the debate between plurality and unity can be seen as a conflict between reason and will. This conflict can take two paths: one involving reason internalizing will and the other involving will surpassing reason.

In the former path, three potential philosophical schemes can be derived. The first scheme is Leibniz's "pre-established harmony", where he acknowledges the independence and plurality of monads but simultaneously absorbs the plurality of monads into "reason" as "pre-established harmony". Thus the relation between the monads of plurality and the rationality of monism is still not thoroughly explained, but is merely prevaricated by a "pre-established harmony".

The second scheme is Kant's "kingdom of ends". Kant establishes the kingdom of ends of practical reason, attempting to assimilate arbitrary will. Within this kingdom of ends, although there can be countless participants, all participants must adhere to moral laws, resulting in the paradox of "many as one". It appears to be numerous participants, but in reality, it is only the embodiment of rational order.

The third scheme is Hegel's dialectical mode. Hegel, more precisely than Leibniz and Kant, sees the conflict between plurality and unity. He does not imitate Leibniz and Kant's attempt to establish a "kingdom of ends" to assimilate arbitrary will and heterogeneity. Instead, he realizes that heterogeneity and plurality are precisely the possibility for unity to be established. Universal consciousness can only be realized based on mutual recognition, and spirit can only become absolute spirit. Therefore, plurality is not the enemy of unity; on the contrary, without plurality, there is no unity. Similarly, without unity, the existence of plurality is also chaotic.

While Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel hold different philosophical positions and propose different philosophical schemes, they all attempt to internalize reason to resolve the dispute between unity and plurality, or between reason and will. Their core idea is to internalize will in reason in order to achieve harmony within reason.

Contrary to the above path, there exists another possible philosophical programme, one that allows the will to transcend the limits of reason. Rather than assimilating the will, reason becomes an instrument for its defence.

The completion of this philosophical scheme is Wittgenstein's consideration of "certainty". Wittgenstein's contemplation on "certainty" is consistent with his later philosophical purpose. He emphasizes that language practices precede some kind of rational order. According to him, language is not the "perfect order of a crystal", but rather the "rough ground".

Wittgenstein's early thought held that logic ensures the existence of the world. In his early thought, the relationship between propositions and facts was such that propositions construct a world linguistically, and the world is narrated linguistically in a logical way that makes what can be said sayable. Conversely, the content of metaphysics, aesthetics, ethics, etc., is unsayable.

Wittgenstein's consideration of "certainty" completely breaks free from such constraints. In Wittgenstein's view, "knowledge" and "certainty" are decoupled. Prior to Wittgenstein, philosophers' contemplation of "certainty" was a contemplation of certainty within knowledge, and philosophers always sought certainty within knowledge. A typical example is Descartes' universal doubt and the contemplation of "Cogito, ergo sum". Descartes metaphorically referred to knowledge as a tree, establishing a foundationalist epistemological path where knowledge needs the support of certainty, and this certainty must be appealed to some basic belief. In Wittgenstein's consideration of "certainty", he completely breaks free from such constraints. In Wittgenstein's view, "knowledge" and "certainty" are decoupled. In Wittgenstein's view, knowledge in the form of reasoned propositions implies the possibility of being overturned and questioned. Therefore, the propositions of knowledge have a truth value and can be determined to be true or false. However, there are also propositions that cannot be determined as true or false.

According to Wittgenstein, "truth" and "falsehood" are products of the space of reasons. He emphasizes that this space of reasons cannot be endlessly questioned, and one cannot endlessly demand the reasons for something and defend it. However, beyond this space of reasons, there is a mysterious territory that philosophers have not yet ventured into, and this is the realm of "certainty".

In Wittgenstein's view, the knowledge of the world is the result of language games played out in various forms of life. The propositions of knowledge entail the possibility of being overturned and questioned. Therefore, the propositions of knowledge are not purely anchored in reason. As he said: "But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its

correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false.”(Wittgenstein, L,1972)

In this way, Wittgenstein's consideration of "Certainty" presents a completely different philosophical scheme than those of Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, and other rationalists.

Wittgenstein's consideration presents a clever structure where certainty is a force beyond the space of reasons and the defense of knowledge. It is monist, but it has the potential for being mistaken and questioned, making it pluralistic. Hence, the non-rational monist and the rational pluralist are intricately linked.

It is clear that Wittgenstein's pluralism differs from Hegel's. Hegel's pluralism seeks to provide a rational basis for plurality, that is, universal freedom of consciousness. Therefore, Hegel's pluralism is internal to unity or rationality. Wittgenstein completely detaches certainty from knowledge, and as a result, certainty is monist or foundational, but this foundational nature is not internal to knowledge. The space of knowledge is a space of reasons where truth and falsehood exist, and one can argue, adjust, and question within this space, making it pluralistic.

This leads to the conclusion that Wittgenstein's consideration of "certainty" is a path of thought that places will beyond the constraints of reason. In this context, reason is demoted to a tool and no longer holds the elevated position it has traditionally held in philosophy.

In connection to Wittgenstein's theological views, his discussion with Moritz Schlick best illustrates this perspective. This discussion was recorded by Friedrich Waismann:

“Schlick sagt, es gab in der theologischen Ethik zwei Auffassungen vom Wesen des Guten: nach der flache-ren Deutung ist das Gute deshalb gut, weil Gott es will;nach der tieferen Deutung will Gott das Gute deshalb, weil es gut ist. Ich meine, da die erste Auffassung die tiefere ist: gut ist, was Gott befiehlt. Denn sie schneidet den Weg einer jeden Erklärung, 'warum' es gut ist, ab, waherend gerade die zweite Auffassung die flache, die rationalistische ist, die so tut,'als ob' das, was gut ist, noch begründet werden konnte. “(WWK 115, December of 1930)

Schlick believes that God needs goodness because it is good. In other words, in the relationship between goodness and God, goodness precedes the existence of God. This is a rationalist path of thought.

Wittgenstein strongly disagrees with Schlick 's view. He believes that God declares what is good. Wittgenstein considers this view to be profound because it cuts off all explanations for "why something is good", which are superficial and the views of rationalists who continue to seek a reason "apparently". Wittgenstein believes that the nature of goodness has no bearing on the facts and therefore cannot be explained by any proposition.

This denial of "why" inquiry negates the absoluteness of rational inquiry. The implicit issue

in the discussion of God is precisely the issue of "certainty" and "knowledge". In this context, "God" is a representation of "certainty", a force that cannot be measured by the subject's rationality.

In a way, Wittgenstein revived the late medieval anti-Thomistic theological view that God is only a product of the will and cannot be measured by reason; rather, God can only be approached through faith.

Wittgenstein's thinking about certainty is thus a new pluralistic programme of thought, one that emphasises the will over reason. Therefore, there is no need to seek a solution to the conflict between unity and plurality within knowledge or reason; rather, they should be completely separate, forming a link between monistic irrationality and pluralistic reason.

A Possible Path to Pluralism: A Critical Reflection on the Individual and the Community

The above discussion shows the contrast between the two pluralistic philosophical programmes. However, as mentioned in the first section, the conflict between unity and diversity is rooted in the principles of substantiality and subjectivity. The most influential philosophical contribution of modern times is the recognition of the principle of subjectivity. The core belief of the principle of subjectivity is that everything must undergo subjective examination, as Hegel stated, "The principle of the modern world requires that whatever is to be recognized by everyone must be seen by everyone as entitled to such recognition." (Hegel, 1991)

While this principle of subjectivity is a philosophical principle, it also serves as a survival principle that distinguishes modern society from ancient society. The French political scientist Constant pointed out the "The Liberty of Ancients and of Moderns," stating, "So you can see that we can't any longer enjoy the liberty that the ancients had, consisting in constant active participation in collective power. Our liberty has to consist of the peaceful enjoyment of private independence." (Constant, 2020)

In ancient societies, freedom was evident as political freedom or citizen participation in politics, while in modern society, freedom is a manifestation of private domain freedom. It is precisely for this reason that modern society has established the principle of freedom of speech and the open society principle of diversity.

To insist on this alone, however, is to fall into purely individual freedom. It is impossible to ignore the fact that every member of society exists within a particular group, and that the principles of that group require us to submit to its will in a coercive manner. The most remarkable contribution of modern society compared to ancient society lies in establishing the

freedom of the private domain. As long as one does not infringe upon the freedom of others, they can enjoy sufficient personal freedom. This is precisely what John Stuart Mill attempted to demonstrate in "On Liberty" – the "limit of individual and collective power" principle, which clarifies the boundaries between society and the individual. Although this boundary is not fixed and is subject to change, its establishment is the greatest contribution of modern society.

Nevertheless, there is always an external force compelling us to conform, so the relationship between the individual and the community is not simply about the individual surpassing the community or the community dominating the individual. On the contrary, the individual must constantly reflect on the limits of themselves and the community, the limits of reason and non-reason. While Hegel's monistic reason presents a attractive philosophical solution to the conflict between diversity and unity within reason, there is no denying the fact that Hegel's path still entails a reconciliation within monistic reason that ultimately negates the significance of the irrational. In contrast, Wittgenstein points out the significance of non-reason in dominating reason, but this path may lead to overly conservative possibilities.

Therefore, the relationship between the individual and the community, reason and non-reason, should follow a path of "cautious reflection." In this path, the individual must constantly reflect on themselves and the community, the limits of reason and non-reason, with the purpose of completing a kind of thinking that exists within limits, so the individual must simultaneously be aware of the significance of reason and the dominative nature of non-reason to resolve the conflict between unity and diversity within the limits of monism and pluralism.

Conclusion

This paper attempts to show that Wittgenstein and Hegel provide two completely different philosophical schemes of pluralism, and that the difference between the two is to establish how to arrange the relationship between "Reason" and the "Will" in conflict, with Hegel emphasizing the absorption of reason into the will and the realization of the will's rationalization. Hegel emphasizes the absorption of the will by reason and the rationalization of the will, thus making plurality an intrinsic part of monism that can be recognized by reason. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, attempted to split reason and will, thus balancing the two. Thus, by reviewing the pros and cons of the two, we propose a new theoretical scheme of plurality, i.e., to think at the boundary between reason and will, and thus to reflect and think at the boundary between individual and communal consciousness, in order to reflect on how the individual can obtain his own meaning of existence within the compulsory requirements of the community.

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