



**FUTURITY
PHILOSOPHY**

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.57125/FP.2024.12.30.03>

How to cite: Bingham, C. (2024). Education and Artificial Intelligence at the Scene of Writing: A Derridean Consideration. *Futurity Philosophy*, 3(4), 34-46. <https://doi.org/10.57125/FP.2024.12.30.03>

Education and Artificial Intelligence at the Scene of Writing: A Derridean Consideration

Charles Bingham

*PhD, Professor, Educational Philosophy, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, V7A1S6, Canada.
<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9804-0574>*

***Corresponding author:** *cwb@sfu.ca*.

Received: June 19, 2024 | **Accepted:** September 4, 2024 | **Available online:** September 25, 2024

Abstract: Skepticism of the written word has been prevalent in philosophical discourse at least since the works of Plato. This article employs philosophical method. It situates the ongoing educational concern with AI Chatbots in terms of this skepticism toward writing. Specifically, this longstanding skepticism posits that the written word is an alienated form of the spoken word. This article demonstrates how two prevalent traditions of education—traditional and progressive—take up this same skepticism. The article calls upon the work of Jacques Derrida, whose deconstructive theories on Plato and the written word problematize this line of writerly skepticism. Derrida’s work on Rousseau’s *Emile* informs a more general approach to pedagogy which entails what Derrida calls “the logic of supplementarity.” This “logic” involves the paradoxical debt that writing owes to speech. Thus, one can discern a distinct sense in which education—in general—is implicated in a tension that exists between the written word to the spoken. Ultimately, this articles suggests that the ongoing concern with

AI Chatbots—linked to an ancient skepticism toward writing—is none other than a concern with the very practice of education *per se*.

Keywords: ChatGPT, LLMs, Philosophy, Derrida, Rousseau, Writing

Introduction

Maybe ChatGPT wrote this article. Or maybe ChatGPT didn't. Would it be worrisome if ChatGPT wrote this article? Why would it be worrisome? What possible problems could there be with an AI-written article being submitted and published in an academic journal? In this article, I argue if there are any problems with such an AI-written article being published in an academic journal, then such problems are also problems of educational philosophy. They are not problems of educational philosophy in the sense that this particular journal includes articles on philosophy of education and therefore an article written by AI would infect the scholarly discourse on educational philosophy. They are not problems in the sense that AI writing has the potential to corrupt professors as well as their students. They are problems of educational philosophy in the sense that education itself, and especially two prevalent forms of education—progressive and traditional education—education itself is implicated in the same worries that guide whether or not an AI article might be considered a worrisome article to be published.

This article will proceed as follows. First, I will situate AI writing in the line of skepticism about the written word emanating, in philosophy, at least as far back as the works of Plato. This skepticism has long worried that the written word is an alienated form of the spoken word. Next, I will show ways in which two most prevalent forms of education—traditional and progressive—take up the same worries and concerns. Subsequently, I will turn to Jacques Derrida, whose deconstructive work on Plato and the written word problematizes this line of writerly skepticism. I will show that Derrida's work on Rousseau's *Emile* informs a more general approach to pedagogy which entails what Derrida calls "the logic of supplementarity" (Derrida, 1974, p. 215). This "logic" involves the paradoxical debt that writing owes to speech. Through his analysis of the written versus the spoken word in *Rousseau*, one can discern a distinct sense in which education in general is implicated in a certain paradox that exists in the relation of the written word to the spoken. Ultimately, I return to ChatGPT and this article. I suggest that the ongoing concern with ChatGPT is none other with a concern with the very practice of education *per se*.

What if "Nobody" is There? ChatGPT and Plato's *Phaedrus*

In Homer's *The Odyssey*, the famous escape of Ulysses from his captor, the one-eyed monster named Polyphemus, comes when Ulysses cleverly tells Polyphemus that his name is "Nobody" (Homer, 1919; Pratt 2023). Then, when Ulysses forces a sharpened log into Polyphemus's eye, the monster can only cry out that "Nobody is hurting me!" (Homer, 1919). With this clever trick, the other monsters do not come to Polyphemus's rescue and Ulysses is able to escape.

The current educational concerns about AI writing can be fairly summed up in the story of the name “Nobody” which enables Odysseus to escape the revenge of Cyclopes. This is to say, AI writing has precisely “Nobody” as its author. Nobody to hold accountable, nobody to capture as author. When one worries about AI writing in education, one worries mainly that student essays, term papers, assignments, etc. will be submitted whose author is, so to speak, “Nobody.”

While it is not clear of course that this Homeric story is a metaphor for the perils of anonymous writing, what we do know is that Plato was familiar with this Homeric story (Aguirre & Buxton, 2020; Calder, 2021; Tilg, 2022). And we also know that Plato was famously critical of the written text insofar as the written text runs the risk of circulating in a way that is unhinged from its author. The written text, following Plato, has “Nobody” for an author insofar as it circulates far and wide, far from whoever put the words into print. The following oft-cited excerpt of Socrates from the *Phaedrus* attests to Plato’s condemnation of writing:

Writing, Phaedrus, has this strange quality, and is very like painting; for the creatures of painting stand like living beings, but if one asks them a question, they preserve a solemn silence. And so it is with written words; you might think they spoke as if they had intelligence, but if you question them, wishing to know about their sayings, they always say only one and the same thing. And every word, when once it is written, is bandied about, alike among those who understand and those who have no interest in it, and it knows not to whom to speak or not to speak; when ill-treated or unjustly reviled it always needs its father to help it; for it has no power to protect or help itself (Plato, 1925).

What is clear about current educational concerns about AI writing is this: Such concerns are as old as Plato (Karamanolis, 2020; Staehler, 2023). They are concerns that the written word might be unreasonably irresponsible (Macé, 2021; Trotz-Liboff, 2023). They are concerns that when one reads a text, one may not be in a position to find human verification for what the text means (Reames & Courtney, 2021; Street, 2022). One is concerned that the text may be “bandied about” without a its parent coming to the rescue.

Platonic Thought in Progressive and Traditional Education

As outlined above, Platonic thought is skeptical of the written word. It is skeptical of the written word because it is skeptical of receiving ideas second hand. The written word, one step removed from its actual author, leaves one without recourse to the author’s actual, living thoughts. In other words, the written word is one step removed from actual experience. Against this backdrop of the dangers of the written text it is possible to discern a line of Platonic that that has echoes in modernist versions of education.

First of all, one hears resonances of this Platonic skepticism in the work of John Dewey and the many inheritors of Dewey’s progressivism (Bieger, 2020; Boyles, 2020; Fiore, 2022; Thorburn, 2020). This Platonic bent is particularly apparent in the progressive critique of traditional education (Hildebrand, 2022). Dewey (1986) contrasts traditional and progressive education as follows: “At present, the opposition, so far as practical affairs of the school are concerned, tends to take the form of contrast between traditional and progressive education”. He notes this: “That education is not an affair of ‘telling’ and being told, but an active and

constructive process is a principle almost as generally violated in practice as conceded in theory” (Dewey, 2001, p. 44). The traditional school, following Dewey (1907), “is so isolated from the ordinary conditions and motives of life that ... [it] is the one place in the world where it is most difficult to get experience” (p. 31).

For Dewey, the shortfall of schools is the problem of direct experience (Thorburn, 2020). Traditional practices remain ensconced in a system where knowledge is explained to students. Students, in turn, remain onlookers, spectators (Bieger, 2020). In schools one does not get enough direct experience. Schools are a place where one reads about experience rather than participating in experience. Dewey’s progressivism can thus be considered thoroughly Platonic in the sense that progressivism replaces the reading of texts with human action and human experience. Dewey, like Plato, is skeptical that reading is a derivative practice compared to the direct interaction of human experience. Dewey, like Plato, would rather be doing than reading.

Yet one can also detect a similar Platonic skepticism of the written word in traditional forms of education. How is this so? Traditionalism, as it continues to be practiced, orients itself toward the explication of texts. Teachers and professors act as living mouthpieces through which texts are given life. Traditional education encourages the “telling” of texts so that texts will not be read *incorrectly* by students. So while Dewey (1907) criticizes traditional education for being “isolated from the ordinary conditions and motives of life,” the traditional educator will respond to Dewey as follows: Actually, the two practices, traditionalism and progressivism, are after the same end (p. 31). They simply use different means. While progressivism aims to combat the non-presence of texts with the presence of direct experience, traditionalism aims to combat the non-presence of texts with the living mouthpiece of the teacher.

Furthermore, the traditional educator will criticize the progressivist’s method of evading the written text. Following the above logic of experience, Dewey’s aim is forever to escape the written text, replacing it with direct experience. When Dewey writes that the “school is life, not a preparation for life,” the traditionalist will clearly discern a loathing for written texts *per se*. The traditionalist’s response to Dewey is not that experience is a bad thing. It is rather that the baby of the text must not be thrown out with the bathwater of indirect experience. The text can be experience too. For the traditionalist, the text becomes experience through the living voice of the educator.

At this point, I would like to take a short, but I hope not inappropriate, detour through the Platonic impulses that resonate at some academic conferences. At some academic conferences it is common to read aloud the papers that have been accepted for submission. Following the above description of the traditional impulse with regard to written texts, it should be noted that the act of reading one’s paper aloud is thoroughly Platonic in a traditionalist sense. Why do we read papers aloud? We do so because we are still participants in Plato’s *Phaedrus*. We are still suspicious that the written word will go “bandied about” in some errant fashion if its author is not present to ensure the authenticity and the meaning of the written text at hand. At conferences, those who read papers are all Platonic in the traditionalist sense.

The Question of ChatGPT is Not a Moral Question

So far, I have used the filter of Plato's condemnation of writing to limn a philosophical perspective on AI writing and the relation of the written word to progressive and traditional projects in education. I have done so in part to critique current educational discourse that too often considers AI writing to be primarily a *moral* dilemma (Popenici, 2023; Selwyn, 2022). It is too often construed as a tool that will give students too much free reign to plagiarize. More profoundly, though, we must ask whether the incursion of this radical new technology into education should give us pause to ask deeper questions about education itself, rather than prompting us to focus on the personal aspects of morality that easily gain the attention of media and school policy.

Of course, many educators have already accepted that the role of AI writing is here to stay, and have therefore advocated for it to become a matter of educational practice, and not simply a matter of educational concern (Giannini, 2023; Schiff, 2021). Many thoughtful educators are inventing ways to engage their lessons with AI itself (Holmes & Tuomi, 2022). These practices are in my opinion more philosophically instructive than they are praiseworthy or imitation worthy. It is not terribly noteworthy to engage a new technology in the classroom (Schiff, 2021). From MOOCS to Learning Platforms to Social Media to Digital Portfolios to Computer Animated Design to ChatGPT—on and on and on—technology has become an excellent variable to compliment classroom practices (Giannini, 2023; Schiff, 2021). While these practices are laudable, they are, ultimately, the stuff of educational methods. I see in AI writing something more significant, something more profoundly educational with regard to pedagogical concerns of presence versus absence, of somebody versus Nobody, of experience versus alienation.

Educational discourses that embrace AI writing are particularly instructive because such educational discourses inevitably start with the caveat, "You can't stop AI writing. It's here to stay." On a superficial level, this caveat is addressing the way that one cannot stop technological innovation, of which AI writing is an example. On a deeper level, though, I argue that the impulse to "stop AI writing" reveals a centuries old concern with writing itself. Why would we want to stop AI writing? Precisely because we are, whether progressive or traditional, inheritors of Plato's skepticism about writing itself. AI writing is not just writing. It is writing that goes to the heart of the problematics of writing itself. It is not writing that might *perhaps* get "bandied about," might *perhaps* becoming dislodged from its author's intent. It is writing that always already does not have an author to begin with.

Derrida, Rousseau and "The Reduction of Writing"

I now turn to Jacques Derrida who has given much attention both to the Platonic skepticism of the written word, and to a deconstructive understanding of education (Bingham, 2001, 2010; Bingham et al., 2012; Bojesen, 2021). Of course Derrida was not aware of ChatGPT. He passed away years before it was invented. My goal is not to elicit a Derridean perspective on technology (Jin, 2021; Sjöstrand, 2021). It is rather to offer a deconstructive understanding of education—and of writing—and to discover whether such understandings shed some light on the current educational predicament of AI writing.

Derrida's most significant work on writing and education appears in his early text, *Of Grammatology*. In the text, he situates Rousseau in a long line of thinkers whose aim has been to subjugate the written word to the spoken word (Nancy, 2023; Oberhammer, 2021). And in particular, Rousseau does so in *Emile*, his famous text on education. As Derrida (1974) points out, Rousseau partakes in skepticism toward the written word, what Derrida calls "the reduction of writing":

Within this age of metaphysics, between Descartes and Hegel, Rousseau is undoubtedly the only one or the first one to make a theme or a system of the reduction of writing profoundly implied by the entire age (p.98).

What's more, Derrida points out the way in which Rousseau understands education *per se* as indicative of the general movement by which that which is present, what is experienced, gets supplemented by that which is secondary or derivative (Derrida, 2020). Derrida (1974) notes first that in Rousseau's *Emile*, education is criticized for being a "dangerous supplement" (p.141). Education is an addition to the natural (Bingham, 2006). It is a supplement to how children would naturally develop. As such, education as articulated by Rousseau is always in danger of being derivative. Thus education is not just a supplement, it is a "dangerous supplement."

Derrida (1974) writes this of education as it is depicted in Rousseau's *Emile*,

The supplement will always be the moving of the tongue or acting through the hands of others. In it everything is brought together: progress as the possibility of perversion, regression toward an evil that is not natural and that adheres to the power of substitution that permits us to absent ourselves and act by proxy, through representation, through the hands of others. Through the written [par écrit] (p. 147).

Derrida notices something in Rousseau that is not clearly stated in Plato's critique of writing. Namely, that education *per se* as a project is equated with the same alienation from pure presence as the project of writing (Bielik-Robson, 2020). Rousseau uses both writing and education as examples of "dangerous supplements." For Rousseau, education teaches us the written word, among other unnatural, albeit beneficial, things (Mendie & Udofia, 2020). In doing so, education itself is implicated in the non-presence of the written.

Deconstruction and the "Dangerous Supplement"

Of course, Derrida's project aims to do something different than to simply underscore the voice-centeredness of Rousseau, than to simply show Rousseau's condemnation of education as a dangerous supplement. Derrida's famous deconstructive project includes demonstrating that supplements such as education are not so simple. Educational supplements are not so clearly exteriorities that add something alien to the student, or to the speaker. Instead, educational supplements are in the paradoxical position of using *unnatural* means to make a person more *naturally* complete. Pedagogy functions within an logic where "it is indeed culture or cultivation that must supplement a deficient nature, a deficiency" that cannot be adequately

supplied by nature itself (Derrida, 1974, p. 146). This economy is what Derrida (1974) identifies as “the logic of the supplement” (p. 165).

Quoting Rousseau, Derrida (1974) goes on to say that “[a]ll organization of, and all the time spent in, education will be regulated by this necessary evil: ‘supply [suppléer] ... [what] ... is lacking’ and to replace Nature” (p. 146). Pedagogy is an endeavor caught up in this paradoxical logic of supplementarity: Students need to be given their educational supplements not only because they lack a certain amount of knowledge, but also because such knowledge completes them and becomes inseparable from them. Education is both an addition to, and a natural part of, the student. The classroom both contributes to certain habits of nature, and creates naturalness out of other non-natural habits that are supplied by education. In so doing, education undermines the very natural/unnatural distinction that Rousseau is at pains to insist upon. Even Rousseau admits that “the success of education is almost impossible....Our efforts may bring us within sight of the goal, but fortune must favor us if we are to reach it. What is this goal? As we have just shown, it is the goal of nature” (Rousseau, 1986, p. 13). Thus Rousseau admits, and Derrida underscores the paradox, that what is unnatural becomes natural through education. The logic of the educational supplement blurs the natural/unnatural distinction.

As Derrida points out, this educational blurring of the natural/unnatural distinction is the structural equivalent of the complicated relationship between the written and spoken word. Writing is supplemental to speaking in the same paradoxical way that education is supplemental to the natural state of the one educated. Just as one cannot do without the supplement of education in order to advance, so too, the spoken word cannot do without the written word once writing is introduced. The written word is not simply an alienated reference to that which is spoken. Once the written word is introduced, the spoken word cannot live without its written counterpart. The written word “dog” is not simply an addition to its spoken counterpart. The written word “dog” is not simply alien or derivative. The written word “dog,” once introduced, changes the spoken word forever.

But unlike Rousseau who saw worry in both writing and education, unlike Plato who saw worry in writing, Derrida sees in both education and writing an ineluctable post-structure. It is the structure that comes after phono-centrism. It is the post-structure that ensues when one no longer longs to avoid the written word. For Derrida, to get past the worry of writing and education is to get past a nostalgia that has captured the imagination of philosophers for centuries. And here I argue that this same nostalgia has captured the imagination of would-be philosophical counterparts—both traditional and progressive—for too long. In education, as in language, there is no word, as there is no student, which has not already been infected by that “dangerous,” and unnatural, supplement.

AI Writing, Deconstruction, Education

I hope it is becoming clear by now that AI writing has bigger fish to fry in educational thought than whether or not our students use it to cheat their teachers. Following the line of Platonic/Rousseauian skepticism about the written word, one way to conclude this article might be so say that AI writing has launched educationalists, whether progressive or traditional, into a new era. Why a new era? Because AI writing seems to have inaugurated the fruition of a line of skepticism that has held educators at both ends of the

progressive/traditional divide in check with each other. Progressivists have, for over a century, insisted on experience, while traditionalists have insisted, for much longer than that, on the enlivened, spoken words of the teacher—both in an effort to mitigate against the “bandied about” written text.

Clearly, no one had foreseen the coming form of writing that would, for all intents and purposes, consummate this widely held skepticism. We now have a form of writing that is, quite precisely, nothing but “bandied about.” AI writing not only *tends* to separate itself from its author. It never had an author to begin with. It is in this sense the most free-floating of writing insofar as it doesn’t even claim to be linked to the living, breathing experience of one who undertook to accomplish the writing. If I am indeed, right now, laboring to write what you are reading (or what you are listening to), then AI writing is something different. It is Platonic/Rousseauan/Progressive/Traditional skepticism of the written word come to life. It is the errant writing that philosophers have been worried about since writing came along in the first place.

Conclusion

One could end this article on this note. By observing that education has come to a decidedly pivotal point in time with the advent of AI writing. If it is at all true that the predicament of pedagogy has resonances with the predicament of the “dangerous supplement,” then there is something profoundly unexpected happening on the educational stage when writing—a practice that has been at the core of supplemental concerns since the time of Plato, and which has been at the core of pedagogical concerns since the time of Rousseau—when writing turns a corner and becomes, in at least one of its forms, forever severed from that which it has purported to supplement for so many centuries. Writing now need not have truck with an author. That is a startling position for education.

But I would like to conclude this article by making some different observations. These observations are directed back to writing itself, and to education as a Derridean practice of the logic of the supplement. A Derridean practice that embraces, rather than shuns as “dangerous,” the inevitable changes inaugurated by the written word and unnatural additions of education. The first observation is this. Taking the Derridean critique of phono-centrism seriously, one must indeed wonder if both Traditional and Progressive education are indebted to this logocentric tradition in ways that limit how we think about education. Is education truly an endeavor that needs to be marred by a continued skepticism toward the written word? By a skepticism toward experiences that are not experiences of presence? If one takes the current worries about AI writing as an example, then this sort of worry seems to be perennial and unavoidable.

I would argue that it is possible to take a different, more flexible and malleable approach to education’s relation to that “dangerous supplement.” Perhaps we should look more closely, as Derrida did, at the educational experiences that entail so-called non-presence. When we use AI writing, whether we use it as educational researchers, as teachers, or as students, is it truly the case, following this Platonic worry, that we have severed the ties that used to bind the written word to any semblance of personhood?

When Derrida takes Plato to task for his “phono-centrism,” he sensed in the Platonic distinction between speaking and writing a certain forgetfulness toward the less-than-present aspects of the spoken word itself. Derrida reminds his readers that the spoken word itself is *not really* so present. Speech is *not* a clear window onto the essence of thinking. He reminds the readers of “Plato’s Pharmacy” in *Dissemination* that the spoken word is not the thing itself—not the thing itself of a person’s thoughts (Derrida, 2016). Nor is it the thing itself in terms of the things that the spoken word is called upon to represent. The word “dog” is hardly the dog, even when the word “dog” is spoken instead of written. Derrida reminds us that in all actuality, the spoken word is hardly less vicissitudinous than the written word. Even the spoken word is a supplement, and the spoken word’s supplementarity puts its authenticity, its presence, into question.

One might put this into a formulation with regard to AI writing. At the present moment AI writing is being posed as the object of skepticism vis-à-vis writing *per se*. This is indeed equivalent to the way that writing itself has been the object of skepticism vis-à-vis the spoken word. Now combine this with a more general skepticism about the “dangerous supplement” that is education. Education has, at least since Rousseau, been posited as a supplement that must become a non-supplement. Education has been seen as an addition to presence that must not admit that it is an addition to presence. If there is any doubt about this supplementary concern, just look at the extent to which concerns about academic dishonesty have recently proliferated in schools and universities. The essence of concerns with academic dishonesty is precisely the essence of concerns about that “dangerous supplement.” Namely, how can one reconcile the fact that, on the one hand, education itself is meant to supplement the natural self by means of a non-self? Yet on the other hand, becoming educated is supposed to pertain to the natural growth of the natural self. Academic dishonesty is always about this conflicting requirement: “Let the thoughts of others be yours, but admit they are not truly yours.”

Against this backdrop of the natural/unnatural dichotomy, and the spoken/written skepticism, I want to argue here that one should understand AI writing not as a limit situation where some new alienated form of writing has appeared on the scene. Not as the ultimate severing between the author and the “bandied about” text. And certainly not as a demonstration that pedagogy has finally met its match in the face of a supplement that will always stay just that—an alienated supplement.

We should rather celebrate a time in technological history that may be as significant as the advent of writing itself. This is once again a time where the boundaries between the natural and unnatural are at stake. In stark contrast to those who would say that such a stake threatens the project of education, I argue rather that education is being chased back to its roots. As both Rousseau and Derrida show, education has always been concerned with what is “bandied about.” Education has always been concerned with knowledges, abilities, dispositions *that may have forgotten their roots*. Knowing where one comes from is always a good place to start when one wants to know where to go from here.

I did not use ChatGPT to write this article. Though I could have. Questions that may always remain to be answered are: Why does one care? Who is still afraid of the written word...

wherever its forms may lead? Who is still concerned with Polyphemus that “Nobody” may have written this article? And, How is education continually implicated in this longstanding fear?

Suggestions for Future Research

This article focused on the philosophical implications of a new technology—Large Language Models—for education. It was beyond the scope of this article to consider the long history of technologies in education as a philosophical matter. One could say that education has *always* been an intervention on technology, whether the technology be reading, writing, calculating, navigating, healing, etc. Thus, a direction for further research is twofold: First, an extended philosophical investigation into Large Language Models and their relation to education, one that considers philosophical work beyond Derrida. Second, further philosophical investigation is needed into the longstanding relationship between education and *various* technologies over the centuries.

Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge the ongoing support of Simon Fraser University for professional development making the writing and dissemination of this research possible.

Conflicts of Interest

None.

Funding

The author received no funding for this research.

References

- Aguirre, M., & Buxton, R. (2020). *Cyclops: The myth and its cultural history*. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0075426922000568>
- Calder, M. L. (2003). *Encounters with the Other: A journey to the limits of language through works by Rousseau, Defoe, Prévost and Graffigny*. Rodopi. <https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/en/publications/encounters-with-the-other-a-journey-to-the-limits-of-language-thr>
- Bieger, L. (2020). What Dewey knew. The public as problem, practice, and art. *European Journal of American Studies*, (15–1). <https://doi.org/10.4000/ejas.15646>
- Bielik-Robson, A. (2020). Derrida Denudata: Tsimtsum and the Derridean metaphysics of non-presence. In A. Bielik-Robson & D. Weiss (Eds.), *Tsimtsum and Modernity: Lurianic Heritage in Modern Philosophy and Theology* (pp. 389–418). Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110684353>
- Bingham, C. (2001). I am the missing pages of the text I teach: Gadamer and Derrida on teacher authority. *Philosophy of Education*, 57, 265–272. <https://educationjournal.web.illinois.edu/archive/index.php/pes/article/view/1903.pdf>

- Bingham, C. (2006). Authority is never genuine, but neither is giving it up: Toward a Derridean theory of un-enlightened empowerment. *Philosophy of Education*, 62, 453–461. <https://educationjournal.web.illinois.edu/archive/index.php/pes/article/view/1580.pdf>
- Bingham, C. (2010). Knowledge transmission is a manner of speaking. *Philosophy of Education*, 66, 369–371. <https://educationjournal.web.illinois.edu/archive/index.php/pes/article/view/3058.pdf>
- Bingham, C., Dejene, A., Krilic, A., & Sadowski, E. (2012). Can the taught book speak?. *Philosophy of Education*, 66, 199–206. <https://educationjournal.web.illinois.edu/archive/index.php/pes/article/view/3625.pdf>
- Bojesen, E. (2021). Contradictions in educational thought and practice: Derrida, philosophy, and education. *Studies in Philosophy and Education*, 40(2), 165–182. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-021-09752-1>
- Boyles, D. (2020). *John Dewey's imaginative vision of teaching: Combining theory and practice*. Myers Education Press. <https://www.torrossa.com/en/resources/an/5671918?digital=true>
- Derrida, J. (1974). *Of grammatology* (G.C. Spivak, Trans.). Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. (Original work published 1967)
- Derrida, J. (2016). *Dissemination* (B. Johnson, Trans.). Bloomsbury Publishing. (Original work published 1972)
- Derrida, J. (2020). *Deconstruction in a nutshell: A conversation with Jacques Derrida, with a new introduction*. Fordham University Press. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1198zt6>
- Dewey, J. (1907). *The school and society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. https://brocku.ca/MeadProject/Dewey/Dewey_1907/Dewey_1907a.html
- Dewey, J. (1986). Experience and education. *The Educational Forum*, 50(3), 241–252. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00131728609335764>
- Dewey, J. (2001). *Democracy and education*. Pennsylvania State University. <https://nsee.memberclicks.net/assets/docs/KnowledgeCenter/BuildingExpEduc/BooksReports/10.%20democracy%20and%20education%20by%20dewey.pdf>. (Original work published 1916)
- Fiore, A. (2022). Dewey's and Pareyson's aesthetics. A dialogue between pragmatism and hermeneutics. *European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy*, 14(1). <https://doi.org/10.4000/ejpap.2728>
- Giannini, S. (2023). *Generative AI and the future of education*. UNESCO. <https://www.laifitalia.it/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/385877eng.pdf>

- Hildebrand, D. L. (2022). John Dewey. In S. F. Aikin & R. B. Talisse (Eds.), *The Routledge Companion to Pragmatism* (pp. 26–34). New York: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315149592-6>
- Holmes, W., & Tuomi, I. (2022). State of the art and practice in AI in education. *European Journal of Education*, 57(4), 542–570. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ejed.12533>
- Homer. (1919). *The Odyssey*. (A. T. Murray, Trans.). New York: London: William Heinemann; New-York: G.P. Putnam's Sons. (Original work published 1488)
- Jin, H. (2021). Deconstructive hermeneutics of nature and culture: Thinking after Derrida. *Space and Culture*, 24(4), 679–696. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1206331219828287>
- Karamanolis, G. (2020). The reception of Plato's Phaedrus in early Christianity. In S. Delcomminette, P. d'Hoine, & M.-A. Gavray (Eds.), *The Reception of Plato's Phaedrus from Antiquity to the Renaissance* (pp. 103–118). De Gruyter. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110683936>
- Macé, A. (2021). Outside the walls with Phaedrus: Derrida and the art of reading Plato. In K. Larsen and P. R. Gilbert (Eds.), *Phenomenological Interpretations of Ancient Philosophy* (pp. 347–364). Brill. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004446779_015
- Mendie, J. G., & Udofia, S. N. (2020). A philosophical analysis of Jacques Derrida's contributions to language and meaning. *International Journal of Humanities, Management and Social Science (IJ-HuMaSS)*, 3(1), 20–34. <https://doi.org/10.36079/lamintang.ij-humass-0301.109>
- Nancy, J. L. (2023). *Derrida, supplements*. (A. O'Byrne, Trans.). Fordham University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781531503406>
- Oberhammer, A. (2021). Dialectic in Plato's Sophist and Derrida's 'Law of the Supplement of Copula'. In V. Rees, A. Corrias, F. M. Crasta, L. Follesa, & G. Giglioni (Eds.), *Platonism: Ficino to Foucault*, (pp. 314–324). Brill. <https://brill.com/edcollbook/title/36043#page=320>
- Plato. (1925). *Phaedrus* (H. N. Fowler, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd. <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0174%3Atext%3DPhaedrus%3Apage%3D275>
- Popenici, S. (2023). The critique of AI as a foundation for judicious use in higher education. *Journal of Applied Learning and Teaching*, 6(2), 378–384. <https://doi.org/10.37074/jalt.2023.6.2.4>
- Pratt, K. E. (2023). Monster and hero?: Rethinking Polyphemus and Odysseus in Homer's Odyssey. *Limina: A Journal of Historical and Cultural Studies*, 28(2), 31–42. <https://search.informit.org/doi/10.3316/informit.T2024032700000490162799274>

- Reames, R., & Sloey, C. (2021). Writing the manic subject: Rhetorical passivity in Plato's Phaedrus. *Philosophy & Rhetoric*, 54(1), 1–24. <https://doi.org/10.5325/phlrrhet.54.1.0001>
- Rousseau, J.-J. (1986). *Emile*. (B. Foxley, Trans.). London: Guernsey Press. (Original work published 1762). <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/5427/5427-h/5427-h.htm>
- Schiff, D. (2021). Out of the laboratory and into the classroom: The future of artificial intelligence in education. *AI & Society*, 36(1), 331–348. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-020-01033-8>
- Selwyn, N. (2022). The future of AI and education: Some cautionary notes. *European Journal of Education*, 57(4), 620–631. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ejed.12532>
- Sjöstrand, B. (2021). Derrida and the phenomenology of technology. In *Derrida and Technology: Life, Politics, and Religion* (pp. 51–66). Cham: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83407-4_3
- Staehler, T. (2023). Logoi of the soul: Phenomenological mindfulness in Plato's Phaedrus. In S. Ferrarello & C. Hadjioannou (Eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Mindfulness* (pp. 95–105). London: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003350668-8>
- Street, N. (2022). The erotic madness of writing in Plato's Phaedrus. *Philosophy & Rhetoric*, 55(4), 386–410. <https://doi.org/10.5325/phlrrhet.55.4.0386>
- Thorburn, M. (2020). Embodied experiences: Critical insights from Dewey for contemporary education. *Educational Research*, 62(1), 35–45. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00131881.2019.1711437>
- Tilg, S. (2022). On the idea of Homer in the ancient novel: A study of direct references to the father of classical literature. In M. P. F. Pinheiro, S. A. Nimis, & M. Fusillo (Eds.), *Modern Literary Theory and the Ancient Novel: Poetics and Rhetoric* (pp. 63–86). Barkhuis. <https://doi.org/10.2307/jj.2808997.9>
- Trotz-Liboff, L. (2023). Writing as Pharmakon and the limits of law in Plato's Statesman, Phaedrus, and Laws. *Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek and Roman Political Thought*, 40(3), 391–414. <https://doi.org/10.1163/20512996-12340415>